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» *Making democracy works from below:  
civil culture and its challenges in Indonesia*

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## Making democracy works from below: civil culture and its challenges in Indonesia

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### Abstract

*Implementing democracy sometimes challenging in recent Indonesian context. It has faced the strong sense of individualism that may disrupt the collectivism spirit. This made democracy was not working since the upper class dominate the public spaces. This inequality should be curbed by revitalizing the civic culture. The latter definition simply means how the government could able to accommodate the voice of voiceless into the policymaking processes. It also needs the public commitment to be a watchdog to guard this aspiration from below. I use a mixed method to conduct this research. Because of pandemic COVID-19, the primary data taken through zoom platform with various informant from academia, activists, and member of society. Meanwhile, the secondary data derived from the relevant literatures. The finding showed that while the civic culture could be a panacea in shaping democracy especially within urban Indonesia context, this still a long way to go. The political will of both sides government and civil society is important to make democracy working from below.*

### Keywords:

civic culture, democracy, participation from below, Indonesia.

### Introduction

The fundamental problem faced by most urban communities in Indonesia is individualism. This refers to the pattern of behavior of city people who are more concerned with personal interests and freedom of personal expression. These two things actually reflect the influence of urban modern culture that has been deeply rooted. A classic literature mentions two important reasons modernism and individualism have strong roots, namely the individual as a social product and individuals who behave socially deterministically (Aubrey, 1935:435).

The first understanding, the individual as a social product, which sees individualism as guaranteeing economic and political equality based on the function and contribution of each individual in urban society.

While the second understanding looks more at the size of the role of an individual will affect social relations in urban society. These two classical understandings are supposed to be inherited in the mindset of today's urban society. The difference is that in the past equality was built from the logic of contribution to goods and services, now equality is now built on the domination of the majority in all fields.

The shift of equality meaning has given rise to academic debate. The central point of the debate is when the population is getting *civilized* through modernization, but increasingly uncivilized practices also followed it *such* as intolerance in social relations. This condition makes it important to revitalize civic practices which have so far been dim amid the strengthening of the personal ego. As for one of the important points to be raised in this paper is *civic culture*. Broadly speaking, the notion of *civic culture* itself is based on the social practices of citizens based on *interpersonal trust* and participation in the public space (Muller & Seligson, 1994: 646). The dimensions regarding mutual trust can be elaborated in various forms of parameters, namely being ready to accept different opinions, trying to listen even if they sound foreign, trying to always explain (Jennstål et al., 2020: 374) .

From a simple explanation of the definitions and parameters, *civic culture* can become a catalyst for the revitalization of civil society in the urban context in Indonesia. Therefore, the research question that I want to further investigate in this paper is: Why is "Civic Culture" important in strengthening participation and equality in urban civil society? This question is related to the ideal way of *civic culture* in initiating participation and equality for city residents. An important finding from this study is that "Civic Culture" plays an important role in strengthening participation and equality in urban society, especially in building social capital which is now being eroded by the increasing expression of individualism.

Furthermore, discussion of *civic culture* and urban civil society will be elaborated in the following sub-sections: 1) Challenges and Problems of Participation and Equality in Urban Communities, 2) Definitions of Civic Culture and Civil Society. The Urgency of Civil Society in Cities?, 3) Comparative Experience on civic culture of urban civil society in other countries, and 4) Conclusion: Opportunities and Expectations of "Civic Culture" and Civil Society in Indonesian Urban Context.

## Data & Method

The method I use in this project is mixed method. It enables me to elaborate data more deeply from the direct sources such as interviews and FGD and also indirect sources such as relevant journal and books. Because of the peak of pandemic COVID-19 in Indonesia during 2021, all the research activities should be online. I relied much on zoom platform to have conversations with various informants such as academia, activists, students, and bureaucracies. From these interviews, I compared the data with the literature reviews I got. This combination resulted in the insightful data analysis in this paper.

## Challenges and Issues of Participation and Equality in Urban Communities

The main problems that are currently surfacing in urban Indonesia are intolerance and the lack of commitment to human rights. These two things are actually part of the *civic culture* that was mentioned earlier. It is these two things that will open doors for challenges and problems regarding the participation and equality of civil society in urban areas.

Broadly speaking, the main challenge in urban society is the difference in quality between big cities and small cities in Indonesia. The quality in question includes social relations between city residents, the government's concern for inclusiveness, and a balanced relationship between city residents and their government. According to two reports on urban studies compiled by the Setara Institute and INFID in 2020, there are symptoms of inequality in the quality of participation and equality in Indonesian cities.

Setara Institute focuses on the tolerance practices of Indonesian cities. There are two important findings in the Setara report, namely 1) "big cities with dynamic levels of social interaction and the backgrounds of the most diverse citizens are a challenge because it requires *effort* to manage tolerance that is so large compared to smaller cities" and 2) "the trend of civil society participation in strengthening tolerance and harmony is actually at the upper middle level and has not yet touched the grassroots" (Setara institute, 2020:7).

The two findings of Setara point to two basic problems that this paper wants to address, namely that civil society is not present in large and heterogeneous urban areas and the difference in participation between upper-middle-class and lower-middle-class citizens. The absence of civil society as a bridge between heterogeneous urban communities seems to be the main reason for the lack of participation and equality for urban citizens in Indonesia. Apart from that, what is really important is the weakening of *interpersonal trust* so that the city residents are socially segregated from each other.

INFID itself focuses on efforts to promote human rights values carried out by the local government. Similar to Setara's results, big cities also don't seem to care too much about implementing human rights for their citizens. INFID raised the case of a small town outside Java, namely Palu and a small district on the island of Java, namely Wonosobo, which deserves to be called the City of Human Rights (Zuhroh, 2020: 25 & 31). Palu is called a City of Human Rights because one of its regional regulations is designed to recognize the basic rights of citizens such as the right to participation, the rights of women and children, the right to security, and the right to welfare (Zuhroh, 2020:27) . Apart from that, this city also organizes a series of formal and informal forums that include all elements of society to ensure equality of aspirations (Zuhroh, 2020: 29–30) . Similar to Palu, Wonosobo also has a regional regulation that is pro-human rights values and also a regional human rights commission to guarantee the representation, participation and equality of its citizens (Zuhroh, 2020: 32–33). Interestingly, Wonosobo also has a collaborative network with several local communities to encourage inclusiveness.

INFID's presentation clearly shows that the disparity between big cities and small cities in Indonesia is more a question of how committed the local government/regional head is in promoting equality for the

citizens of their cities. This initial finding seems to provide another analysis regarding equality and citizen participation. There is a problem of political commitment (*political will*) from political elites and also the inequality of big cities (*towns*) and small towns (*towns*) basically more on an inclusive paradigm that has not been built. The big city with all its social dynamics and heterogeneity emphasizes the economic approach, it achieved namely equality if everyone works. This is the point of error that encourages equality and participation only occurs in social groups/environments where a citizen is affiliated (*intrapersonal trust*) but not across social groups (*interpersonal trust*). That's why it's important that *civic culture* can be an alternative perspective in mapping problems and solutions for equality of urban citizens.

## Definition of Civic Culture and Civil Society: The Urgency of Urban Civil Society in Indonesia.

Understanding of *civics Culture* itself has lots of multiple interpretations of meaning. This is because the term has many definitions that are reviewed from various perspectives. The various definitions of *civic culture* will later influence the content and context of urban civil society.

Political Science defines *civic culture* itself as part of the essence of public political participation which aims to strengthen the democratic system. An authoritative study conducted by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba called *civic culture* simply the process by which citizens control the behavior of political elites (*citizens exercise control over elites*) (Almond & Verba, 1963b: 180). The process of citizen control over political elites is also part of political participation in influencing making public policy (Almond & Verba, 1963a: 214).

The strengthening of citizens' active political participation actually also shows a revitalization of the functions and objectives of citizens which are not only the *subject of the law* but also develop into *demos*. *Demos* itself refers to the image of a society that was active in the era of substantive democracy in the ancient Greek era. The strengthening of the role of the *demos* also shows that there is a correction to the practice of representation-based electoral democracy which actually increases the bargaining position of the elite over the public. It is this inequality that makes *civic culture* needed in the current era, especially in urban communities.

Bringing back *civic culture* as *demonstrations* as described above, of course, has various challenges. Especially in urban society which is individualistic, the ideal *civic behavior model* is still a big question. Almond and Verba then offered three important approaches, namely *cognitive*, *affective*, and *evaluative* (Street, 1994:97). The definition of *cognitive* refers to an individual's ability to access the center of power, *affective* is more directed to emotions and feelings towards the system of power, and *evaluative* is more to the ability of citizens to evaluate the performance of the government.

Of the three models of the *civic culture approach* described by Almond and Verba, the *evaluative aspect* is crucial in bringing back public political participation and advocacy to society. This is because most urban people are basically information literate, but are sometimes skeptical of government processes.

Even more so with the differences in socio-economic backgrounds among city residents. This is the next challenge to bring equality to form the same *evaluative perceptions* among city residents with different backgrounds.

The most important essence in presenting *civic culture* in urban communities is how to plan equality and active participation for city residents who have different backgrounds. This is because there is a spirit of a *civic culture* that connects micro-politics and macro-politics (Street, 1994:98) . In this paper, the notion of micro-politics itself is urban residents as civil society, while macro-politics itself is a political system with elites. The most important meaning of the micro and macro-political relations is how *civic culture* develops as a new norm for society to contribute to the formulation of public policies. As well as being a norm, *civic culture* is also closely related to rules that prevent the elite from always being at the top of an ivory tower, while society is not always at the bottom. All actors must be in an equal position.

The most important point from the discussion about applying the classic idea of *civic culture* in urban civil society is how to plan an ideal model of urban political participation that is appropriate. The existence of the term *demos* alluded to actually reinforces the importance of “voice” for urban communities. The voice referred to in this context is a way of conveying the aspirations of citizens so that they can be heard and conveyed in forums in the arena of public policy making. It also intended the meaning of *voice* as a communication of the idea of public space. This understanding refers to communication between “the center” and “the periphery” which aims to equate the democratic views between the elite and the community (Febriasih, 2012:26). It is the communication between the two actors that will later form public opinion which is actually a form of indirect control function of the citizens over the elite in the public sphere (Febriasih, 2012: 27) .

In the theoretical debate, *voice* literally means the voice of the public whose aspirations need to be heard by the elite. This definition refers to the implications of the “winners-losers gap” that occurs in implementing electoral democracy (Merkley et al., 2019: 849). The existence of this disparity also results in an *unaccommodated voice* , especially for voters whose choice lost in the general election. This disparity provides an important example of how these *voices* can be accommodated and eliminated through the general election system. This condition then triggers a debate about the meaning of *voice* in modern democracy.

An important debate in the effort to interpret *voice* lies in the extent to which public aspirations can conveyed in the formal political arena. This then refers to the search for an ideal model in placing *voice* in democracy. In recent literature studies, there are two fundamental perspectives on the meaning of *voice* , namely communication and social movements (Lawy, 2017: 195–196). The first perspective argues that *voice* is related to agency and representation issues. The context of the problem lies in the actor “*having a voice*” and the actor “*claiming one’s voice*” (Lawy, 2017: 195). It related both terms to the authority/ authority entitled to represent the *voice* . The second perspective argues that *voice* is related to issues of recognition, equality, and also identity politics (Lawy, 2017: 196). This second perspective gives more meaning to the *voice* in the form of “collective voice” (Lawy, 2017: 196).

Related to the fundamental debate about the meaning of *voice*, the first perspective more or less criticizes the existence of claims of authority in the formal political arena that places *voice* to legitimize power. The pattern of institutionalization of *voice* actually makes *voice* purely aspirational because there are various layers of interests and actors. However, *voice* as a model of representation is still important to read the debate process in public policy formulation. Meanwhile, the second perspective defines *voice* as advocacy outside the system. By placing “*voice*” as “*collective voice*”, they understand public voice as a complete form of aspirations that are not accommodated in the electoral democratic system. This highlights the problem of majority and minority as a classic problem in democracy. *Voice* as advocacy then suggests more informal ways of voicing aspirations without having to take part in the system.

Thus, from the explanation of the various typological sources of the definition, *civic culture* itself is an effort to convey two-way aspirations that are carried out in an advocative manner to control the behavior of the government’s political elite indirectly. This is also related to how to voice marginalized voices in urban society so that they can be conveyed comprehensively. In the following table, it attached an explanation of the aspects and definitions of *civic culture* within the framework of an ideal civil society in urban areas as follows.

*Table 1 : Civic Culture and City Civil Society Development*

No	<i>civic culture</i> dimension	Meaning and Purpose	Development Direction to Urban Civil Society
1	<i>Civic Culture</i> as Aspiration	<i>Civic Culture</i> functions as a bridge between the elite and urban society in an equal and egalitarian position	Civil Society acts as an agency that brings together people across backgrounds and political elites in the public space.
2	<i>Civic Culture</i> as an Advocacy Movement	<i>Civic Culture</i> functions as a <i>civic arena engagement</i> from cross-element communities in fighting for certain issues	Civil Society acts as a catalyst that plays a role in driving awareness and a spirit of tolerance
3	<i>Civic Culture</i> as a Function of Public Control	<i>Civic Culture</i> has the role of being an <i>intermediary actor</i> that collects critical voices of the community towards the elite through public spaces based on online and offline channels	Civil Society acts as a <i>watchdog</i> against the potential abuse of power by authorities and related stakeholders.

Source: (Jati, 2022).

*Civic culture* values themselves grounded in urban civil society. Aspirations, Advocacy, and Public Control of Political Elites at least provide the initial foundation for the formation of urban civil society. However, it is also a good idea to look at the problems and the foundations of civil society debates in Indonesia.

## Fundamental Problems of Urban Participation and Presence of Urban Civil Society

The main problem in urban society is the guarantee of basic rights as clothing, food and shelter. Apart from that, there is also a channel for direct aspirations from the grassroots to the arena of public policy making. Both show the active participation of the city government to ensure its survival and also the active participation of the community in conveying their aspirations to the government. The fundamental key to urban participation is how *civic engagement* is formed. The government feels responsible for the citizens of the city, while the citizens of the city need to exercise public control over making public policies.

The point of *civic engagement* between city residents and their government is crucial. The crucial point lies in the extent to inclusive relationship is built between the government and the urban community. This mainly refers to how the position of city residents should ideally be in a central position in urban public policy. However, the problem of urban participation itself turns out to be quite complex than imagined. The mapping of urban participation problems includes 1) elite hijacking - what we mean is the role of the political elite which is too dominant in the public policy-making process. This resulted in the emergence of 2) the limited role of minority urban groups such as women, children and people with disabilities in participating in public policy making, 3) the process of public participation was actually hijacked by the bureaucratization process because participation did not have bureaucratic channels, 4) limited access information regarding the formulation of public policies for urban communities to take part, 5) reduced private sector interest in public participation because it is considered unprofitable, and reduced interest of stakeholders / political elites in the process of public participation which is considered too long (Indrawan, 2020: 137) .

The five problems disclosed above show the existence of an unequal position experienced by the community and government elites. This also shows that *civic engagement* has not been fully developed in today's urban situation. That is why it is important to have an empowered civil society that acts as an agent acting as an intermediary between the grassroots and government elites. As well as being an agent, urban civil society is certainly a catalyst for equality that needs to be started from grassroots reasoning. However, before we plan the ideal building for urban civil society, it is better for us to examine the debate over the academic discourse of civil society in Indonesia.

The discourse on civil society in Indonesia is actually a classic idea that has not yet reached an ideal form. This is because of the many debates that color the idea of civil society. The debate involves linking ideas between the West and Islam in formulating an ideal society in Indonesia. Meanwhile, Western educated scholars exalt the context of *civil society* as the right form of ideas. Meanwhile, scholars who were born and raised in a religious academic environment actually promote the existence of "civil society" as an ideal idea for Indonesian society. In short, "civil society" (*civil society*) is more directed to the context of



an independent and egalitarian society where they appear as balancing actors in *governance relations* between the government and intermediary actors, for example, the media and also non-governmental organizations. Whereas “civil society” is more directed at the conditions of a society that is inclusive and tolerant of others by setting aside all forms of differences in political color and ethnicity. It is these two scientific schools of civil society that later is their ideal form in urban civil society.

The most important idea of the existence of *civil society (civil society)* in Indonesia can be observed from the period in which the idea grew and developed. The first thing that is important to note is the difference as the “vertical” and “horizontal” models found in civil society. As for what we intend as a “horizontal” civil society is a society that is formed based on social norms all groups of society has mutually agreed that upon (Muhtadi, 2003: 43) . This shows that there are communal arrangements carried out internally by the community itself in upholding harmonious relations between members of the community. Meanwhile, the meaning of “vertical” civil society shows the existence of a spirit of autonomy and independence carried by civil society as a political actor. This condition shows the spirit of political control that civil society wants to convey. This is because the policy-making map has so far been layered because of market and government domination.

In contrast to the context of civil society, the form of “civil society” itself is more directed to a pattern of society that obeys applicable law (Sularto, 2001:39). The law referred to here includes the rules of state law and religious law that have been mutually agreed upon. This legal definition also implies that there is a recognition of the most basic human rights such as the right to life, the right to personal expression, and the right to freedom of opinion which is free from state intervention (Sularto, 2001: 36) . The existence of a space for recognition of human rights law actually also shows that there is a gap in the autonomy of civil society towards the state. It’s just that when compared to the previous context of *civil society*, the context of civil society itself is more towards relative autonomy. Broadly speaking, the context of civil society itself is still hierarchically based on the state.

The fundamental significant difference between *civil society* and civil society itself refers more to the conditions of a different society. The condition of *civil society (civil society)* is more driven by the condition of a heterogeneous society both in terms of identity and socio-political background. This triggers the need for equality to increase in a heterogeneous society. The strengthening of the need for equality is more or less influenced by balanced power relations (*power-sharing*) between each actor in society both in terms of economic status, social status, and political status (Fahrudin, nd: 50) . This condition also shows the existence of an ideal recognition that no actor benefits from other actors (*zero-sum*) so that it balance all elements of society both in formal and informal relations. The existence of *power sharing* and *zero-sum* actually shows that individual freedom is the driving force of civil society itself. The main points in this freedom include *self-generating* as well as *self-supporting* which is reflected in the expressions of these individuals (Muhtadi, 2003: 61) .

In contrast, civil society is more started from the conditions of a homogeneous society. This is the main reason it is easy to regulate state law and religious law. The role of religion is indeed dominant in reorienting society so that it becomes the central point of both the relationship between the state and God

Almighty (Sularto, 2001: 49) . Of course, by looking at the conditions in which religion becomes a social norm and the state becomes a legal norm, it is expected that the condition of civil society will more or less be driven by the majority group rather than the minority. Apart from that, this civil society may only be driven by other identity factors that are communal. The existence of this communal aspect then distinguishes it from the previous civil society. The existence of a *voluntary* principle is the basic point why this civil society has a strong social system which is based on the closeness of identity and religion. So thus, the appearance of religion or other identities as *civil religions* has made the existence of religious/identity norms a normal thing accepted by society. The emergence of the idea of civil society grows and develops in a society that is psychologically close to one another and is dogmatically bound by a certain religious norm.

So by looking at the debates and complexities in the two schools of thought, the ideal form of a civil society that can be implemented in urban areas is of course still a fundamental question. Indonesia’s urban society is heterogeneous both socio-cultural and socio-economically. However, when viewed from a socio-religious perspective, urban communities are homogeneous with Islam as the majority religion. It is the mixing of these two schools of thought in urban society that makes the urban civil society model a hybrid. On the one hand, there is a strong desire for autonomy and independence for spaces of expression from the state to make it easier for urban civil society to express themselves, but there is a desire to continue to play an important role for religion in daily affairs. So when described in tabular form, the ideal model of Indonesian urban civil society in terms of the two schools of thought is as follows.

*Table 2: The Ideal Form of Urban Civil Society*

No	Civil Society Models	Ideal Parameters	The Ideal Form of Urban Civil Society
1	Civil Society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Autonomy from the State</li> <li>- Political participation in control</li> <li>- Recognition of individual rights and obligations in society</li> <li>- We can say the position of the state and society to be in an equal and balanced position</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Urban Civil Society can be formed in the form of informal forums that are institutional or non-institutional</li> <li>- Urban Civil Society can be as online social groups that have a real impact on life.</li> </ul>

2	Civil Society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Empowered by the state but structurally still under the state</li> <li>- Common legal agreements and arrangements are the key to solidarity and solidarity between elements of society</li> <li>- Inspired by religious values as a unifier</li> <li>- There is implementation of the majority values that are widely accepted, including minorities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Urban Civil Society can be a kind of groups of critical citizens who can be united in religious ties</li> <li>- Urban Civil Society can also take the form of a large forum as an umbrella for various interests.</li> </ul>
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Source: processed from various kinds of information

By looking at the explanation in table two, the forum model is informal or *social group* which is more targeted at online movements in cyberspace. The association model that knows no membership and is based on issues of interest seems to be the ideal basis for the growth and development of urban civil society in Indonesia. However, the problem of representation and partiality seems to be a classic problem in this urban civil society. Also, this forum and discussion group models are usually bias towards the middle class rather than all community groups. That's why the problem of representation in this form of civil society is a problem. Apart from that, with this *social group* model , the issues being advocated for are usually thematic issues. This is the big question, whether this city's civil society social group will overshadow all kinds of inter-citizen interests.

So after we get the ideal model regarding the form of urban civil society in the Indonesian, it is also a good idea to take various kinds of empirical cases found in various countries of the world. We use this as a *brainstorming* whether the form of the forum and citizen model started in table two is also ideal for urban civil society movements in other countries. It also related this to the question of alignments and representation which apparently is still a serious problem in Indonesia. Even though it is said that urban civil society is a rational actor in politics, they still plague it with problems of group bias and biased views, all of which still show inequality between majority and minority positions.

## Comparative Experience of City Civil Society Civic Culture in Other Countries

The comparative discussion on urban civil society in countries basically aims to see whether the idea of forums and social groups as a form of urban civil society exists in other countries. Apart from serving as a verification tool, this comparative discussion also aims to see new aspects that exist beyond the two notions of forms of civil society that have been discussed previously. This comparative discussion aims to get a critical side and a new side to the new civil society movement, especially related to political participation.

The two most important discourses in reading this comparative case are citizenship (*citizenship*) as well as rights to the city (*rights to the city*). These two discourses take place more in the developing countries (*global south*) because the main narratives raised are usually about solidarity and resistance to inequality. The reason for choosing the *global south context* is to see the dynamics of capacity, political interests, and also popular movements of civil society in order to gain institutional access (Stokke, 2018: 10–11). That is why it is very important to discuss the discourse on strengthening city civil society based on political interests in *citizenship* and strengthening city civil society based on popular movements as *rights to the city*. These two discourses have different narratives regarding the way urban civil society movements are formed. The discourse on citizenship (*citizenship*) is more about revitalizing the meaning of citizens in framing community movements. Meanwhile, the discourse on *rights to the city (rights to the city)* is more on resonance with the rights of city residents, especially the lower middle class who have been excluded so far. It is from these two discourses that later the color and substance of the comparative forms of urban civil society movements in other countries will be created.

Citizenship discourse has been extensively reviewed in various recent studies. The latest study on this aspect of citizenship is more inclined to how the informal political dimension can influence the policy-making process at the government level. Mbaye and Dinardi argue that the importance of informal practice over formal practice is part of efforts to exchange knowledge from elites with citizens as civil society (Mbaye & Dinardi, 2019: 581). The most important thing from exchanging knowledge is more directed to the dimension of “what is” (*what is*) at the root of the problem rather than “what should be”. This shift shows the important role of urban civil society, especially in alternative discourses on community development from the grassroots itself (Mbaye & Dinardi, 2019: 582–583). I hope that the active role of the city’s civil society can compete with the formal discourse that has been the domain of the elites.

Mbaye and Dinardi then gave examples of several cases of urban civil society activism in various developing countries such as Sao Paulo (Brazil) and Dakar (Senegal). The Sao Paulo case underscores the importance of the *favela*, namely an inclusive social space aimed at community empowerment. This *favela* also acts as an informal economic incubation space started by several local civil society organizations to accommodate small and medium business actors who are not accommodated in the city market (Mbaye & Dinardi, 2019: 585–586). Whereas in the Dakar itself this shows the role of *Africulturban* as space for special expression among young city residents in the socio-cultural field (Mbaye & Dinardi, 2019:

586–588). Young urban residents who were worried about the diminishing of egalitarian public spaces because started the emergence of Africulturban rich citizens. controlled them It was this condition that made *Africulturban* emerge and make policies from the grassroots for its own citizens.

From the presentation of the two previous case examples, we can find that the *forum model* still seems relevant in the formation of urban civil society. However, from the two models it is not yet clear whether the ideal form is the model of citizenship or the right to the city which will later become the philosophical foundation of urban civil society. The explanation above itself looks more at the mixed model to fight for the interests and rights of the city, but has shown no specific attention to whether the city's civil society has institutional access to policymakers.

Cases of participation as *participatory budgeting* may be cases of significant strengthening of urban civil society participation. This participatory budgeting policy has actually been around for a long time since 1989 in Porto Alegre, Brazil. Since then, this movement has grown rapidly throughout Brazil. By taking Sao Paolo, Brazil, this participatory budgeting can occur harmoniously because there is a good relationship between the party in power and elements of urban civil society as constituencies of voters (Patsias et al., 2013: 2218–2219). Here, the Labor Party is the ruling party in Sao Paulo. This condition shows that strengthening urban civil society can also be partisan because there is an element of electoral relations there. This finding also complements the discussion regarding the form of urban civil society which ideally is an independent movement.

The discussion on participatory budgeting then touches on aspects of the outreach of urban citizen participation in the budgeting process. This is considering the dimensions of participation and aspirations that can included in policy making. The interesting thing about the existence of participatory budgeting is that there is a civil society council called the *council* whose job is to divide the flow of participation of urban civil society members (Hernández-Medina, 2010: 519–520) the Brazilian city of S?o Paulo is characterized by high levels of socio-economic inequality and political polarization, significantly complicating issues of urban governance. Despite being designed to partially address these problems, S?o Paulo's participatory budget (PB. The *council* comprises various strata of civic participation of city residents, starting from *participants, delegates, and councilors* (Hernández-Medina, 2010: 520) *the Brazilian city of S?o Paulo is characterized by high levels of socio-economic inequality and political polarization, significantly complicating issues of urban governance. Despite being designed to partially address these problems, S?o Paulo's participatory budget (PB. An interesting pattern that can be drawn from the councilors factor is the recognition of the need for city minorities who have been marginalized, for example, the poor, transgender people, black people. There is an inclusive scheme that allows minority residents of the city to be elected as councilors by pocketing five votes instead of the twenty votes required by participatory budgeting policy makers.*

If you look at the participation flow pattern above, they will see that this participatory budgeting policy is actually an inclusive policy that encourages *civic engagement* from the grassroots. However, apart from the inclusiveness side, this partisan dimension clearly characterizes this policy. This shows that there is

a clientelism side behind this inclusive participation side. Civil society groups are groups that are constituents of the ruling party (Gómez Bruera, 2015:10) . This condition raises big questions about where the ideal civil society is in realizing participation that is inclusive but also egalitarian. Other findings regarding urban civil society cases in Brazil also show that civil society is actually the main target of technocrats (Dowbor & Houtzager, 2014: 143) . Thus, we can observe that the success of the urban civil society popular movement itself is based on the partisan level and ideological closeness between the party in power and the civil society that is its constituent. The existence of a partisan scent behind this enthusiasm for the spirit of inclusiveness has implications for the victory of the Labor Party at the federal political level.

Compared to the popular movement, where the *civic culture dimension* in society is more inclusive, but partisan. That determines whether *civic culture* , one of its essences is public control, must be interpreted in a partisan way. That's why it's important to see how the dimensions of citizenship in framing aspects of *civic culture* in urban civil society. As previously mentioned, the concept of citizenship based on *the right to the city* is interesting for further discussion. Moreover, to see how initiatives from the grassroots form collective movements in public spaces.

Conceptual debates about citizenship, especially in the *right to the city*, look more at how claims to rights as citizens of the city can be channeled. The dimensions of *the rights to the city* theoretically include various factors such as the right to live (*right to inhabit*) and the *right to use public spaces* (Leontidou, 2010: 1181). Both forms of these rights actually represent the voice of the community. Lower-class urban citizens who do not get a broad place of expression. The development of this massive city economically has marginalized the position of the lower-middle-class citizens in a position of vulnerability. This revitalizes the meaning of citizenship in the current political conditions. This basically leads to the exact form of the equality model.

The two forms of expression of rights above actually also show a shift in the claims of city residents. Previously, the *rights to the city* dimension is more concerned with the right to privacy (*right to private space*) with an emphasis on the right to independent expression per individual (Leontidou, 2010:1196) . The strengthening of the right to privacy among urban citizens is actually contact with modernization and capitalism. However, this actually undermined the civic spirit that had been built by the townspeople before. That's why the context of the *right to use/occupy public space* finds its relevance, namely how to invite all elements of the city's residents to be in an equal position with one another. I intended equality as resistance to the development order and public services which are impartial to the lower middle-class citizens.

The most important pattern of the *right to use/occupy public space* is how deliberately urban civil society can be empowered. This then refers to collective action in fighting for shared aspirations (Mitlin, 2013: 491–492) This collective movement is also the embodiment of the principle of autonomy carried out by urban civil society members that other private interests may not violate. Thus, we can see that *the right to use / occupy this public space* in a genuine and real way was indeed initiated by grassroots groups. It's just that then, is such a model capable of bringing these aspirations to the realm of public policy making. I will discuss the rest of this aspect in the tabulation below.

Table 3: Civic Culture Dimensions and Urban Civil Society Models

No	Civic Culture Dimension	Urban Civil Society Model	Implications for Public Policy Making
1	Public Control over Political Elites	Popular Movement	City Civil Society Synergy with Stakeholders is realized through partisan relations
2	Grassroots Aspiration Bearer	Citizenship / Popular Movement	Stakeholders may not necessarily accept the aspirations desired by urban civil society
3	Advocacy Movement	Popular Movement	Issue-based advocacy, especially when the issue is widely resonant, can influence the public policy-making process

Source: processed from various sources of information

Table 3 actually explains the context of the connection and disconnection of the dimensions of *civic culture* in urban civil society and the implications for urban public policy making. As shown in the table, regardless of which model to take, the most important thing is the pattern of *political will* and also *issue-based advocacy* which became the motor of the urban civil society movement. These two patterns summarize not only partisan relations but also how collectively the citizens of this city will unite in fighting for their aspirations.

## Conclusion

Returning to this research question, namely why is “Civic Culture” important in strengthening participation and equality in urban civil society? The answer that can be offered from various previous descriptions is that *civic culture* helps city residents to become an autonomous and independent civil society. By going through these three aspects, namely public control of elites, aspiration carriers, and advocacy movements, city residents can incarnate themselves as civil society movements either through movement-based or reinforcing discourse as *demos* or active taking part citizens.

Of course, if this related to its opportunities in Indonesia, now the urban citizen advocacy movement has penetrated the embryo of which is the hobbyist movement. Hobbies or interests referred to in this case are cycling movements, environmental movements, or similar movements. The various typologies of this movement actually show that urban civil society in Indonesia has showed itself as a movement. Although

it can be said, these movements are still sporadic and based on interests. This needs to be appreciated considering that it is difficult to invite the city's residents to take part actively.

However, even though these inclusive movements have developed, there are various challenges that need to be underlined. The first and main thing is that the biased perception of the middle class, of course, often arises. Also, the intended aspirations reflect more on the dominance of a group. This condition also shows that there are differences between residents of big cities and residents of small towns. Residents of large cities are predominantly upper middle class, while in small towns they are lower middle class. In another aspect of the challenge, one can also observe a continuity in maintaining the dignity of the urban civil society movement. I still consider even though forums or associations ideal, awareness in urban communities is instantaneous and short-lived, so their commitment to an issue is also short-lived.

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